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Aliens Detained at Guantanamo Bay Have a
Constitutional Right to File Habeas Corpus
Petitions in Federal Court: Boumediene v. Bush
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SUSPENSION CLAUSE - HABEAS CORPUS
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION ALIEN RIGHTS The

United States Supreme Court held that aliens captured abroad
and detained at Guantanamo Bay have a constitutional right to
file habeas corpus petitions in federal court and that the Military
Commissions Act, an attempt by Congress to strip courts of jurisdiction to hear such cases, was a violation of the Suspension
Clause.
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
Petitioners were aliens captured abroad and detained at the
United States Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, under
authority granted to the President by Congress in the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).1 Each petitioner was determined to be an enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT), a military tribunal established by the Department of Defense. 2 The detainees sought to challenge their
detentions by seeking writs of habeas corpus in the United States

1. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008). The AUMF states in relevant
part:
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001). The Supreme Court has held that detention of enemy combatants for the duration
of a conflict is a fundamental incident to war and within the President's power under the
AUMF. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240-42 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518
(2004) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion)).
2. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241. In a 2004 memorandum, the Department of Defense defined "enemy combatant" as an "individual who was part of or supporting Taliban
or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a belligerent
act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces." Memorandum from
Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of the Navy (July 7, 2004),
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d2OO40707review.pdf.
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District Court for the District of Columbia. 3 The district court
dismissed the cases for lack of jurisdiction because Guantanamo is
outside the sovereign territory of the United States. 4 The dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held
that statutory habeas corpus jurisdiction extended to Guantanamo; consequently, the Court reversed the decision of the court
6
of appeals and remanded the cases to the district court.
The district court then considered the detainees' cases in two
separate proceedings, with one judge holding that aliens captured
and held outside the United States had no cognizable constitutional rights and another judge holding that they did indeed have
constitutional due process rights. 7 While appeals to the D.C. Circuit were pending, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act
(DTA), amending the habeas statute to strip courts of jurisdiction
to hear habeas petitions from aliens detained at Guantanamo and
giving the D.C. Circuit exclusive jurisdiction to review CSRT determinations.8 In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 9 the Supreme Court held
that the DTA did not strip courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas
petitions pending when the DTA was enacted. 10 In response, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act (MCA), again amending the habeas statute, this time stripping courts of jurisdiction to
3. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241. Habeas corpus is "[a] writ employed to bring a
person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the party's imprisonment or detention
is not illegal." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004).
4. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241 (citing Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C.
2002), rev'd, 103 Fed. Appx. 676 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
5. Id. (citing Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
6. Id. (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)).
7. Id. (citing Khalid v. Bush, 355 F.Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005); In re Guantanamo
Detainee Cases, 355 F.Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005)).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2008) (federal habeas statute). The DTA states in relevant part
that: "Except as provided in section 1005 of the [DTA], no court, justice, or judge" may
exercise jurisdiction over
(1) an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained
by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; or (2) any other action
against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention by the
Department of Defense of an alien at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who (A) is currently in
military custody; or (B) has been determined by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit ... to have been properly detained as an enemy
combatant.
Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2739, 2742 (2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The "except as provided" referred to the D.C. Circuit's
exclusive jurisdiction to review CSRT determinations and military commission decisions. §
1005 (e)(2), (e)(3).
9. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
10. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241-42 (citing Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 576-77).

Winter 2009

Boumediene v. Bush

hear currently pending habeas petitions." The D.C. Circuit then
considered the detainees' consolidated appeals, holding that the
MCA applied to the detainees' petitions and prevented the court
from exercising jurisdiction. 12 The court further held that the detainees, lacking a statutory habeas right, had no constitutional
right to file habeas petitions in federal court.' 3 Congress's act of
eliminating habeas jurisdiction did not present a Suspension
Clause question, the court reasoned, because the common law writ
14
of habeas corpus had never extended to aliens detained abroad.
Thus, the court dismissed the detainees' claims for lack of jurisdiction and vacated the decisions of the district court.' 5 The detainees then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari,
6
which was first denied but then granted upon reconsideration.
In a majority opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and held that the detainees
did have a constitutional right to file habeas petitions in federal
court." 7 While it agreed that the MCA purported to strip courts of
11. Id. at 2242 (citing Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat.
2600, 2635-36 (2006)). The MCA stated in relevant part:
(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the
United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly
detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination. (2) Except as
provided [in section 1005 of the DTA], no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the United States and has been properly
determined as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination ....
[This
amendment to the habeas statute] shall take effect on the date of the enactment of
this Act, and shall apply to all cases, without exception, pending on or after the date
of the enactment of this act which relate to any aspect of the detention, transfer,
treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an alien detained by the United States
since September 11, 2001.
Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-36 (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 986 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 2229
(2008).
13. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 994.
14. Id. at 991. The Suspension Clause provides: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
15. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 994.
16. Boumediene v. Bush, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct.
3078 (2007).
17. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2277. The case was a 5-4 decision. Id. at 2239. Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
Id. Justice Souter filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. Id.
Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito. Id. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Thomas and Alito. Id.
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jurisdiction to hear the detainees' habeas petitions, the Court
found that the writ of habeas corpus could run to aliens detained
at Guantanamo, raising a Suspension Clause question.1 8 The
Court held that the MCA was an attempt by Congress to deny habeas corpus without complying with the requirements of the Suspension Clause. 19 The judicial procedure available under the DTA
to review a detainee's designation as an enemy combatant, the
Court reasoned, was not an adequate substitute for habeas review. 20 Thus, the Court held, the detainees were entitled to full
21
habeas review in federal court.
Justice Kennedy began the Court's analysis by reviewing the
historical importance of the writ of habeas corpus as a bulwark
against arbitrary abuse of power. 22 The Suspension Clause, he
explained, was designed to protect the writ, at a minimum, as it
existed at the time the Constitution was drafted. 23 While both
parties to the case believed the historical record supported a ruling in their favor on the issue of whether the writ extended to
Guantanamo, the majority found precedent on the geographic
scope of the writ at common law to be inconclusive, emphasizing
that because no case was exactly on point, the historical record
was not dispositive. 24 Justice Kennedy noted the Government's
argument that English courts could not send the writ to territories
controlled by the English monarch yet still considered "foreign,"
such as Scotland and Hanover, but he concluded that this inability
was due not to formal notions of sovereignty, but to prudential
concerns about sending the writ to territories that had their own
court systems and did not follow English law. 25 These prudential
concerns, he believed, did not apply to the instant case because no
26
Cuban court had jurisdiction over Guantanamo.

18. Id. at 2240.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2244-47.
23. Id. at 2248.
24. Id. Justice Kennedy stated:
In none of the cases cited do we find that a common-law court would or would not
have granted, or refused to hear for lack of jurisdiction, a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus brought by a prisoner deemed an enemy combatant, under a standard like the
one the Department of Defense has used in these cases, and when held in a territory,
like Guantanamo, over which the Government has total military and civil control.

Id.
25.
26.

Id. at 2249-50.
Id. at 2251.
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The majority did not question the Government's position that,
under the terms of the lease between Cuba and the United States,
Cuba maintained formal sovereignty over Guantanamo even
though the United States had complete control.2 7 Justice Kennedy
stated that notions of formal sovereignty are political questions
not to be decided by courts, but he went on to say that sovereignty
is a multifaceted concept that can encompass more than simply
formal, technical sovereignty. 28 Drawing a distinction between
formal sovereignty (or de jure sovereignty) and plenary control (de
facto sovereignty), he asserted that the United States had de facto
sovereignty over Guantanamo and rejected the Government's argument that habeas jurisdiction was dependent on de jure sovereignty. 29 The Constitution's protections can apply extraterritorially, he asserted, beyond the formal sovereign territory of the
30
United States.
Justice Kennedy cited a string of opinions, known as the Insular
Cases, which developed a doctrine whereby the Court would extend certain constitutional protections to citizens and noncitizen
inhabitants of unincorporated territories acquired by the United
States, depending on practical considerations, such as whether a
separate legal system existed and whether the territories were
destined for statehood rather than independence. 31 The majority
found that this doctrine directed the Court to give extraterritorial
effect to constitutional provisions wherever the circumstances and
32
practical necessities allowed.
33
Justice Kennedy then maintained that Johnson v. Eisentrager,
in which the Court refused to consider the habeas petitions of enemy aliens detained in Germany during the aftermath of the Second World War, was similarly based on practical considerations
and not notions of formal sovereignty. 34 While conceding that the
Eisentrager Court stressed the fact that the prisoners were never
27. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2251-52.
28. Id. at 2252-53.
29. Id. at 2253. Sovereignty is "[slupreme dominion, authority, or rule." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1430 (8th ed. 2004). De jure means "[e]xisting by right or according to law."
Id. at 458. De facto means "[aictual; existing in fact; having effect even though not formally
or legally recognized." Id. at 448.
30. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2253.
31. Id. at 2253-55 (citing the Insular Cases: De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901);
Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243
(1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903);
Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904)).
32. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2256.
33. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
34. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257 (citing Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 779).
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held in a territory over which the United States was sovereign, he
suggested it was not the lack of de jure sovereignty but the lack of
de facto sovereignty that drove the outcome of that case. 35 The
United States occupied Germany only as a member of the Allied
Powers and thus did not exercise plenary control over the prison
where the Eisentragerprisoners were held. 36 Practical considerations about the constraints of military occupation and the potential of damaging the prestige of military commanders, Justice
Kennedy asserted, informed the Court's refusal to hear the prisoners' habeas petitions. 37 The majority concluded that nowhere in
the Eisentragerdecision was formal sovereignty established as the
only test for the extension of the writ and that practical considera38
tions should control questions of extraterritoriality.
Based on its reading of Eisentrager and the Insular Cases, the
majority identified three factors for determining the reach of the
Suspension Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee;
(2) the nature of the sites where the detainee was captured and
detained; and (3) any practical obstacles that might impede extension of the writ. 39 Applying these factors to the instant case, Justice Kennedy found that: (1) while the detainees were not American citizens, their status as enemy combatants was in dispute; (2)
the detainees were captured and held at sites formally outside the
sovereign territory of the United States; and (3) there were no significant practical problems with extending the writ, as the Government had put forth no credible argument that the military
mission at Guantanamo would be jeopardized if the detainees
were allowed to file habeas petitions. 40 The majority maintained
that the military mission in post-war Germany, as in Eisentrager,
was more sensitive and complex than the mission at Guantanamo
and involved greater practical obstacles to the extension of the
writ than the instant case. 41 While Justice Kennedy noted that
35. Id. at 2257-58. The Eisentragercourt stated that "at no relevant time were [the
prisoners] within any territory over which the United States is sovereign, and [that] the
scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States." Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 778.
36. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2258.
39. Id. at 2259. Justice Kennedy asserted the Court's authority to determine the geographical reach of the writ, stating that by exercising plenary control at Guantanamo while
denying the constitutional protections that apply in formal sovereign territory, the political
branches were attempting to claim the power to "switch the Constitution on or off at will."
Id. at 2258-59.
40. Id. at 2259-61.
41. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261.
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the second factor weighed against extending the writ and admitted that the Court had never in its history granted constitutional
rights to aliens held outside territory where the United States had
formal sovereignty, he again stressed both the lack of precedent on
point and the fact that the United States had plenary control over
Guantanamo. 42 Weighing these factors, the majority held that the
writ would extend to the detainees and that the Suspension
Clause would have full effect at Guantanamo. 43 Because the MCA
did not purport to be a formal suspension, and the Government
did not argue that it was, the detainees were still entitled to chal44
lenge their detention by filing habeas petitions in federal court.
Justice Kennedy then asserted that the Suspension Clause
question could be avoided only if the DTA review process provided
an adequate substitute for habeas review. 45 He noted that this
issue would ordinarily be remanded to the court below but asserted that the gravity of the issues involved and the years of detention the detainees had already endured presented exceptional
circumstances in which it was appropriate for the Court to reach
the Suspension Clause question. 46 Discussing two cases in which
a substitute for habeas review was found to be adequate, Justice
Kennedy pointed out that these substitutes were designed to expedite the petitioner's claims and had saving clauses to make ha47
beas available if the substitute procedures proved ineffective.
After comparing these procedures to those provided by the DTA,
the majority found that the DTA was not an adequate substitute
for habeas review. 48 Justice Kennedy expressed grave concerns
about the factfinding procedures in place during CSRT determination and D.C. Circuit review, noting that detainees had a limited
ability to call witnesses and were unable to introduce new evi42. Id. at 2261-62. Justice Kennedy stated: "It is true that before today the Court has
never held that noncitizens detained by our Government in territory over which another
country maintains de jure sovereignty have any rights under our Constitution." Id. at
2262.
43. Id. at 2262.
44. Id.
45. Id. The DTA empowered the D.C. Circuit to consider: "(i) whether the status determination of the [CSRT] . . . was consistent with the standards and procedures specified
by the Secretary of Defense ... and (ii) to the extent that the Constitution and the laws of
the United States are applicable, whether the use of such standards and procedures to
make the determination is consistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United
States." DTA, Pub. L. 109-148, § 1005(e)(2)(C), 119 Stat. 2739, 2742 (2005).
46. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262-63.
47. Id. at 2264-65 (citing Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977); United States v.
Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952)).
48. Boumediene. 128 S. Ct. at 2265-74.
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dence discovered after the CSRT determination had been made. 49
Although many aspects of the D.C. Circuit's authority under the
DTA (including the power to order a detainee's release if detention
is found unjustifiable) were unclear, the majority concluded that,
given the language used in the DTA and Congress's purpose in
enacting it, the Act could not be interpreted broadly enough to be
considered an adequate substitute for habeas review. 50 Thus, the
majority held that the detainees must be allowed to challenge
their detention by filing habeas petitions in federal court and that
MCA Section 7, which purported to strip courts of jurisdiction to
hear the detainees' petitions, was an unconstitutional suspension
51
of the writ in violation of the Suspension Clause.
Noting the long period of detention the detainees had already
endured and the desire to avoid further delay, the majority held
that the detainees were entitled to file habeas petitions without
52
first exhausting the review procedures provided by the DTA.
Justice Kennedy directed that future habeas cases could be channeled, upon the Government's motion, to the District Court for the
District of Columbia. 53 He recognized the Government's interest
in protecting classified evidence and urged the district court to use
its discretion to accommodate this interest. 54 Before concluding its
opinion, the majority stated that, in holding that the detainees are
entitled to file habeas petitions, the Court expressed no opinion on
what substantive rights the detainees had and noted that this is55
sue was a matter yet to be determined.
In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts sharply criticized the majority
for reaching the Suspension Clause question without first requiring the detainees to exhaust the remedies available under the
DTA. 56 He argued that because no one had yet used the D.C. Circuit review process of the DTA, it was improper, considering the
principle of exhaustion, for the Court to rule on whether it was an
adequate substitute for habeas review.5 7 The Chief Justice asserted that the long period of detention was not a relevant issue
because the detainees had chosen to litigate habeas petitions
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 2269-74.
Id. at 2271-74.
Id. at 2274.
Id. at 2275.
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2276.
Id.
Id. at 2277.
Id. at 2280 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2279.
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rather than use the DTA procedures available to them for over two
years. 58 He also criticized the majority for holding that the DTA
was inadequate without addressing the question of what constitutional due process rights the detainees actually had.59 With no
idea of what the detainees' rights were, it was impossible to determine whether the DTA process protected them. 60 If it did, the
61
Chief Justice argued, habeas review would be unnecessary.
On the question of what due process rights the detainees had,
the Chief Justice pointed out that the Court need look no further
than the recent ruling in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a precedent which
the Chief Justice accused the majority of failing to seriously consider. 62 He noted that, in Hamdi, the Court outlined the due process rights owed to an American citizen determined to be an enemy
combatant. 63 Hamdi should be controlling, the Chief Justice
urged, because the Court had already determined the rights a citizen enemy combatant had, and an alien enemy combatant could
not possibly have more. 64 He argued that Congress enacted the
DTA to comply with the procedures the Hamdi Court said were
required, yet in the instant case the majority found the DTA in65
adequate only by ignoring the standards set forth in Hamdi.
The Chief Justice also criticized the Court for mischaracterizing
the CSRT process. 66 He noted that the majority treated the CSRT
determination as if it were a hasty, battlefield decision on whether

58. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2282 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice noted
that the majority's opinion would not expedite the detainees' claims but would only cause
further delay: 'The effect of the Court's decision is to add additional layers of quite possibly
redundant review. And because nobody knows how these new layers of 'habeas' review will
operate, or what new procedures they will require, their contours will undoubtedly be subject to fresh bouts of litigation." Id.
59. Id. at 2283.
60. Id. at 2279-80.
61. Id. at 2279.
62. Id. at 2284-85 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507).
63. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2281 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-38). The Court in
Hamdi stated that the due process rights of an American citizen designated as an enemy
combatant consisted of the right to "receive notice of the factual basis for his classification,
and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decision-maker." Id. at 533. The process could be "tailored to alleviate [the] uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict" and could include hearsay and a presumption in favor of the Government's evidence. Id. at 533-34. The Court
stated this process could take place before "an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal." Id. at 538.
64. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2281
65. Id. at 2285. The Chief Justice stated that "Congress followed the Court's lead, only
to find itself the victim of a constitutional bait and switch." Id.
66. Id. at 2283-84.
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a detainee was an enemy combatant. 67 To the contrary, the Chief
Justice pointed out, the determination of enemy combatant status
was first made through multiple levels of review by military officials, not by the CSRT. 68 Designed to meet the procedural requirements laid out in Hamdi, the CSRT was actually a forum to
69
challenge that determination.
Discussing the majority's concerns about the weakness of the
factfinding and evidentiary procedures of the DTA, the Chief Justice noted that the DTA provided more access to classified information than any enemy combatant had ever been allowed. 70 He
berated the majority for finding the procedures inadequate without proposing any alternative method for dealing with the sensitive issue of handling classified evidence. 71 Attacking the majority's concern about the inadmissibility of evidence discovered after
the CSRT determination, the Chief Justice accused the Court of
digging for hypothetical problems and inventing a "reverse facial
challenge," under which a statute would be struck down if there
were any conceivable scenario in which it could be constitutionally
infirm.7 2 He also criticized the majority's interpretation of the
scope of the D.C. Circuit's review powers, accusing the Court of
using a "Catch-22 approach," whereby it would not construe the
statute as an adequate substitute for habeas because it believed
Congress could not have intended to enact an adequate substi73
tute.
In summary, the Chief Justice asserted his view that the majority had based its decision on abstract and hypothetical concerns,
striking down a review procedure that provided a very generous
set of protections in favor of a shapeless habeas process that would
probably end up looking just like the discredited DTA process.7 4
He criticized the Court for refusing to respect Congress's attempt
to balance the interests of national security and detainees' rights
through democratic means, concluding that the majority had

67. Id.
68. Id. at 2284.
69. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2285-86 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 2288.
71. Id. The Chief Justice stated that "the majority fobs that vexing question off on
district courts to answer down the road." Id.
72. Id. at 2290-91. A facial challenge is "[a] claim that a statute is unconstitutional on
its face-that is, that it always operates unconstitutionally." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 244
(8th ed. 2004).
73. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2292 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 2292-93.
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taken from the people their power to control foreign policy and
75
placed it in the hands of unaccountable judges.
In a second dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia began by describing what he believed would be the disastrous consequences of the
majority's opinion. 76 Citing instances in which detainees who had
been released from Guantanamo returned to the battlefield and
committed violent atrocities, he argued that the ruling will "almost certainly" result in more American deaths. 77 He attacked
the majority for refusing to defer to the judgment of the political
branches on national security matters and instead choosing to assert its own power to decide sensitive questions it is not in a posi78
tion to understand.
Justice Scalia went on to criticize the majority's legal reasoning,
arguing that it ignored or manipulated history and precedent
which conclusively showed that the writ of habeas corpus could
not extend to aliens captured and held abroad. 79 He asserted that
Eisentragerclearly held that the writ did not extend to aliens outside the sovereign territory of the United States and that the majority's view that the case turned on practical considerations or
involved a distinction between de jure and de facto sovereignty
was not supported by anything in the opinion.8 0 Justice Scalia
then discussed the Insular Cases, which all involved territory over
which the United States was sovereign and, in his view, did not in
any way provide support for extending constitutional rights to
8
aliens outside sovereign territory. '
Explaining that the Suspension Clause only protected the writ
as it existed when the Constitution was adopted, Justice Scalia
discussed the history of the writ in English common law in order
to show that it had never extended to aliens held outside sovereign
territory.8 2 He argued that notions of formal sovereignty prevented the writ's extension to Scotland and that the majority's
75. Id. at 2293.
76. Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 2294-95. Justice Scalia noted that these were detainees determined by the
military not to be enemy combatants, arguing that those determined to be enemy combatants were even more likely to return to the battlefield and commit violence against Americans. Id.
78. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2296 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
79. Id. at 2298.
80. Id. at 2299 n. 3. Justice Scalia described the majority's interpretation as a "sheer
rewriting" of Eisentragerand accused the Court of "blatantly distorting" the case to avoid
explaining why it should be overruled. Id. at 2299, 2302.
81. Id. at 2300-01.
82. Id. at 2303.
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view that practical considerations prevented extension was not
supported by historical evidence.8 3 He also took issue with the
majority's claim that it was significant that there was no recorded
case where a court denied jurisdiction to hear a habeas petition
from an alien held outside sovereign territory.8 4 Justice Scalia
noted such a case would be unremarkable and unlikely to be reported, whereas a case extending the writ certainly would have
been reported.8 5 Concluding that all the historical evidence
showed that the writ could not extend to aliens held outside sovereign territory, Justice Scalia castigated the majority for reaching a
conclusion unsupported by a single case in Anglo-American legal
86
history.
The long history of the writ of habeas corpus dates back to its
first use in England during the reign of Edward 1.87 It was seen as
the means by which the Magna Carta's due process guarantees
were upheld.88 Initially, the writ was used to enforce the King's
prerogative to know why one of his subjects was being imprisoned.8 9 Over time, however, the writ developed into more of a restraint on the King's power, forcing him to prove that proper legal
process was followed when someone was imprisoned. 90 The writ
was codified by Parliament with the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. 91
The thirteen American colonies passed habeas statutes modeled
on this Act. 92 The Framers recognized the importance of the writ
and, when drafting the Constitution, provided that it could be suspended only under limited circumstances. 93 The Suspension
Clause protected the writ as it existed when the Constitution was
94
ratified in 1789.
The geographic scope of the writ at common law was discussed
by Lord Mansfield in 1759 in King v. Cowle.95 He noted that Eng83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2305 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2305-06.
Id.
Id.
9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 108-25 (1926).

Edward I

ruled from 1272-1307. MICHAEL PRESTWICH, PLANTAGENET ENGLAND 582 (2005).

88.

HOLDSWORTH, supranote 87, at 112.

89.

2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §

1341 (3d ed. 1858).
90. Rex Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts-Constitutional Right or Legislative
Grace?,40 CAL. L. REV. 335, 336 (1952).
91. Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2, 5 Statutes of the Realm at 935.
92. Collings, supra note 90, at 338-39.
93. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
94. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).
95. (1759) 97 Eng. Rep. 587 (K.B.).
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lish courts did not have power to send the writ to Scotland and
Hanover, areas that were under the English monarch's control but
considered "foreign" and not part of the sovereign territory of England. 96 On the other hand, English courts could send the writ to
Ireland, which was a separate kingdom but considered English
sovereign territory. 97 The writ also ran to the "exempt jurisdictions," such as Wales and Berwick-upon-Tweed, which Lord Mans98
field described as English sovereign territory.
In the United States, the geographic reach of constitutional provisions (such as the habeas right protected by the Suspension
Clause) was at issue in the Insular Cases.99 These cases involved
noncontiguous territories acquired by Congress under its Article
IV authority following the Spanish-American War. 10 0 Whereas
Congress had previously extended constitutional protections to
new territories via statute, in these cases it had abandoned this
practice, leaving the Court to decide whether the Constitution applied in the acquired territories. 10 1 To decide this question, the
Court developed a doctrine in the Insular Cases whereby the
Court would extend constitutional protections to the territories
depending on the situation in each territory, taking into consideration factors such as whether there existed different laws and
customs and whether the territory was fully incorporated by Congress and destined for statehood. 0 2 In Balzac v. Porto Rico, 10 3 the
Court noted that even noncitizen inhabitants had certain constitutional rights in the territories and that the issue in the Insular

96.
ties as
97.
98.
99.
(1901);

Id. at 600. The English monarch controlled these territories in his separate capaciKing of Scotland and Elector of Hanover. Id.
Id. at 599-600.
Id. at 599.
Dorr, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); De Lima, 182 U.S. 1
Dooley, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes, 182 U.S. 244

(1901).

100. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2300 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The territories in question
included Puerto Rico, Guam, Hawaii, and the Philippines. Id. at 2253 (majority opinion).
Article IV of the Constitution provides: "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
101.

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2253-54.

102.

Dorr, 195 U.S. at 143 ('Until Congress shall see fit to incorporate territory ceded by

treaty into the United States... the territory is to be governed under the power existing in

Congress to make laws for such territories, and subject to such constitutional restrictions
upon the powers of that body as are applicable to the situation."); Downes, 182 U.S. at 293

("ITihe determination of what particular provision of the Constitution is applicable, generally speaking, in all cases, involves an inquiry into the situation of the territory and its
relations to the United States.").
103. 258 U.S. 298 (1922).

192

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 47

Cases was not whether the Constitution applied, but which of its
provisions would be applied under the circumstances of each
case. 10 4 The Court has also stated that the territory in question in
the Insular Cases was territory where the United States had sov10 5
ereign power.
In 1957, the case of Reid v. Covert 10 6 involved the question of
whether the constitutional right to trial by jury extended to the
spouses of American servicemen living on military bases in England and Japan.10 7 The petitioners, who were American citizens,
allegedly committed crimes in those countries and were tried
without a jury by American military courts.' 08 A majority of the
Court held that the right to trial by jury would extend to the petitioners but could not agree on the question of whether to overrule
In re Ross, 0 9 a case in which the Court had refused to extend the
right to trial by jury to a British subject who was convicted by an
American tribunal for a murder committed aboard an American
ship in Japanese waters. 10 The Ross Court, though assuming
that the petitioner had the same rights as an American citizen,
nevertheless denied him constitutional protection."' In Reid, four
members of the majority wanted to overrule Ross while two sought
to distinguish it, arguing that citizenship was not the only factor
to be considered and that practical obstacles (not present in Reid)
had influenced the Ross Court's decision not to extend constitu112
tional protection.
In Eisentrager, the Court directly confronted the question of
whether habeas rights extended to enemy aliens detained outside
United States territory. 1 3 The petitioners were German nationals
convicted of violating the laws of war and held in occupied Germany after the Second World War. 114 They sought habeas peti104. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312.
105. Id.; United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268 (1990).
106. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 15-16.
109. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
110. Reid, 354 U.S. at 78 (Clark, J., dissenting) (noting that four members of the majority would overrule In re Ross while two would distinguish it); see In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453.
111. In reRoss, 140 U.S. at 479.
112. Reid, 354 U.S. at 64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result); Id. at 75 (Harlan, J.,
concurring in result). If the right to trial by jury extended to the Reid petitioners (American citizens) but not the Ross petitioner (treated as an American citizen), the two cases
would be inconsistent if citizenship was the only factor in determining the extension of
constitutional rights. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257.
113. Eisentrager,339 U.S. 763.
114. Id. at 765-66.
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tions to challenge their detention, but the Court refused to grant
them for lack of jurisdiction, noting that there was no precedent
for hearing the habeas petition of an alien captured and held outside sovereign territory. 115 The Court stressed that American citizenship or residence in United States territory entitled one to
generous constitutional rights, but nonresident aliens enjoyed no
such rights, especially in wartime, when the need to defer to executive discretion was great and there was a real possibility that
allowing enemies to litigate in civilian courts could undermine
military efforts." 6 The Court also suggested that if enemy aliens
abroad had a constitutional right to habeas corpus, they must
have a full set of other rights, such as freedom of speech and the
right to bear arms, an absurd proposition completely unsupported
by history or precedent." 7 Holding that the Constitution did not
confer rights on enemy aliens, the Court dismissed the petitioners'
8
habeas claims."
In Rasul v. Bush, the Court distinguished Eisentrager and held
that even if the Constitution did not confer a habeas right on the
petitioners (enemy aliens detained at Guantanamo), the federal
habeas statute did. 1 9 The Court reasoned that its holding in Eisentrager was based solely on constitutional grounds and did not
rely on the habeas statute. 120 This limited holding occurred because, at that time, the statute had been interpreted to mean that
courts could only hear habeas petitions from petitioners located
within their territorial jurisdiction.'12 However, the Court had
since held that presence within a court's territorial jurisdiction
was not an absolute requirement for jurisdiction under the habeas
statute. 122 The Rasul Court thus held that the detainees had a
statutory right to file habeas petitions in federal court. 123 It was
at this point that Congress passed the DTA and MCA to strip federal courts of their statutory habeas jurisdiction over aliens held
124
at Guantanamo, leading to the instant case.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 768.
Id. at 769-79.
Id. at 784.
Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 785, 791.
Rasul, 542 U.S. 466.
Id. at 476.
Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484.
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241-42.
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The five justices in the majority in Boumediene made a decision,
based on principle, that aliens detained at Guantanamo should
have a right to habeas corpus. 125 Their principle, identified by
professor and American legal philosopher, Ronald Dworkin, in an
article praising the decision, is that the "government must allow
1 26 It
anyone it imprisons to challenge his imprisonment in court.'
is an admirable, well-meaning principle that evinces a deep commitment to leaving no stone unturned when it comes to protecting
individuals from abuses of executive power. As applied in this
case, however, this principle is unsupported by anything in the
entire history of Anglo-American law. Moreover, the majority's
assertion of this principle will do nothing to resolve the very difficult questions still surrounding the detention of terrorist suspects.
Instead, it will serve only to complicate the matter. The Court
expressly declined to answer questions about what due process
rights the detainees actually have, how sensitive and classified
evidence is to be handled, and whether American soldiers serving
abroad must be called away from their critical mission to appear
as witnesses in court. 127 Acting as if the magic words "habeas corpus" will somehow make all these issues go away, the Boumediene
majority asserted its grand principle without solving anything.
All the magic words actually did was put a new name on an old
problem.
At the heart of the asserted principle is the notion that unelected, unaccountable federal judges should determine how terrorist suspects are handled, because the people and their representatives cannot be trusted. This notion would, of course, be perfectly correct if something in our Constitution barred the people's
representatives from handling the detainees as they did here, but
the majority's embarrassingly flimsy legal reasoning totally fails
to persuade one that such a constitutional impediment existed in
this case. Rather, it seems as though the justices in the majority
chose the outcome they desired and then reached for any reasoning that might appear to justify it. The result, unsurprisingly, is
that the Court's opinion more closely reflects the justices' personal
policy preferences than it does the most reasonable interpretation
of the applicable law. The Court got its result, but only by ignoring or misrepresenting a great deal of history and precedent and
125. See id. at 2262.
126. Ronald Dworkin, Why It Was a Great Victory, N.Y. REV. OF BooKs, Vol. 55, No. 13
(August 14, 2008), availableat http://www.nybooks.com/articles/21711.
127. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2269-77.
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circumventing established principles of appellate procedure.
While paying lip service to the need to defer to the political
branches on national security matters, the Court bent over backwards to invalidate a decision reached by both Congress and the
Executive working together to comply with the Court's past decisions.128 The two dissents convincingly attack the overreaching of
the majority, correctly identifying numerous errors in judgment
and laying out what would have been a more appropriate path for
the Court to take.
As the Chief Justice pointed out in his dissent, the Court should
never have heard this case in the first place. 129 Standard appellate practice would require the petitioners to exhaust their remedies under the challenged statute before it could be decided
130
whether those remedies adequately protected their rights.
None of the detainees in this case had attempted to use the D.C.
Circuit review process of the DTA. 131 In fact, at the time this case
was decided, no one had ever used it.132 How then can the Court
decide whether that process is sufficient to protect the detainees'
rights? The Court asserted that the lengthy period of time the
detainees had already been imprisoned absolved it of the need to
require exhaustion of the DTA's remedies.133 This assertion, however, does not account for the fact that the detainees chose not to
use the remedies available to them, that the DTA review process
was not crafted overnight, or that it understandably took some
time for the political branches to work out a comprehensive legal
structure to deal with the massive, unprecedented threat of international terrorism. If the Court was serious about deferring to the
political branches, it would have recognized that the DTA was
worth waiting for and would have insisted that its process at least
be tried before being thrown out.
128. Id. at 2276-77. On the need to defer to the political branches, Justice Kennedy
stated:
In considering both the procedural and substantive standards used to impose detention to prevent acts of terrorism, proper deference must be accorded to the political
branches ....
Unlike the President and some designated Members of Congress, neither the Members of this Court nor most federal judges begin the day with briefings
that may describe new and serious threats to our Nation and its people. The law
must accord the Executive substantial authority to apprehend and detain those who
pose a real danger to our security.
Id.
129. Id. at 2280 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 2283.
131. Id. at 2282 n.1.
132. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2279.
133. Id. at 2274-75 (majority opinion).
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The Court also failed to take responsibility for its own role in delaying a final decision on the detainees' claims, as the past several
years have been occupied by a tug-of-war between the Court and
the political branches over these cases. The political branches
tried to resolve the detainees' claims but were repeatedly told by
the Court that their procedures were not good enough. 134 Yet,
when the political branches finally created a process designed to
meet the Court's demands, they were rejected again. In Hamdi,
the Court seemed to have laid out the basic due process owed to a
detainee designated as an enemy combatant. 135 Congress designed the DTA to provide that process. 136 In Boumediene, however, the Court neglected to seriously discuss Hamdi and expressly declined to rule on what due process rights the detainees
had, yet it somehow still found that the DTA was insufficient to
protect those rights. 137 It is unreasonable to blame the political
branches for the delay of a final determination on whether the
detainees' rights have been violated when the Court has steadfastly refused to say what those rights are. Until the Court defines their due process rights, Guantanamo detainees will never
be finished litigating. The Court's insistence on scrapping the
DTA in favor of an undefined habeas review only means the process has to start all over again, with the district courts fashioning
the procedures for habeas review on a case-by-case basis that will
undoubtedly spark more litigation. All the difficult questions remain unanswered. As the Chief Justice argued, by the time the
habeas procedures take shape, they will probably look a lot like
the discredited DTA procedures. 138 The better course would have
been for the Court to require the detainees to use the DTA to challenge their designation as enemy combatants. Then, unsuccessful
detainees could have argued on appeal that specific DTA procedures failed to protect their rights. This method would have allowed the Court to evaluate the DTA procedures in light of their
actual application, defining specific rights as they are alleged to
have been violated.
Aptly described in Justice Scalia's dissent as "manipulation,"
the Court's treatment of history and precedent in its effort to ex-

134. Id. at 2283-84 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
135. See supra note 63.
136. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2284-85 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 2277 (majority opinion).
138. Id. at 2292 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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tend the writ to aliens held at Guantanamo was truly appalling. 139
Admitting that issues of sovereignty are political questions not to
be decided by courts, the Court proceeded to invent a distinction
between formal sovereignty and "de facto" sovereignty which
avoided the political question and conveniently allowed the Court
to mischaracterize a millennium of legal history. 140 According to
the majority, all the years of precedent, which established territorial sovereignty as the basis for a court's habeas jurisdiction, were
not necessarily referring to sovereignty in the legal sense but
4
could have been referring to it in some general, colloquial sense.' '
Under the majority's interpretation, courts for centuries have
based their habeas jurisdiction not on legal concepts but on "prac42
tical considerations."'
This notion allowed the Court to ignore the formal sovereigntybased analysis of Lord Mansfield in Cowle and speculate that the
real reason the writ did not extend to Scotland and Hanover possibly had more to do with "delicate and complicated" political relationships. 143 None of the precedents cited, however, actually discussed any distinction between formal and de facto sovereignty or
expressed the view that the court's jurisdiction hinged on practical
considerations having to do with politics. 44 On this point, the
Court was clearly grasping at straws. The weakness of the majority's historical argument is painfully evident from the wavering
language it used: "[W]e cannot disregard the possibility," "This
might be seen as evidence," "[M]ight explain," "[M]ay well ex-

plain," "[M]ay have prevented ....

."145

Based on this language,

one could conclude that the majority's reasoning, at best, might be
valid. This hedging is not the kind of convincing argument that
should be necessary to support a controversial landmark ruling.
In light of the Court's own admission that it had never held that
aliens detained outside sovereign United States territory had constitutional rights, the reasoning employed in this case was not
46
nearly strong enough to merit such an unprecedented step.
The Court's assertion that Eisentrager was based on practical
considerations was, as Justice Scalia argued, nothing short of bla139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 2298 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2252 (majority opinion).
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2252.
Id. at 2252-59.
See id. at 2249-50.
Id. at 2305 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2250-51 (majority opinion).
See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262.
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tant distortion. 147 Though the Eisentrager Court discussed at
length its view that noncitizens outside the United States did not
have constitutional rights, the majority chose to focus only on a
few sentences in the opinion, which essentially commented that,
even if the prisoners had constitutional rights, it would be impractical for the Court to enforce them. 148 The Court alleged that this
language meant the writ would have extended to the Eisentrager
prisoners if only it were more practical, all the discussion of citizenship and sovereignty notwithstanding. 149
Constantly reiterating the view that its habeas jurisdiction is
limited only by practical considerations, the Court essentially asserted that its power extends anywhere it is realistically feasible
for it to extend. Using this kind of analysis throughout its opinion, the Court eviscerated all the legal considerations that have
defined habeas jurisdiction for centuries. Now, the Court's power
apparently knows no legal bounds and is to be limited only if the
Court itself makes the political decision that asserting jurisdiction
in a particular case would unduly interfere with whatever the political branches happen to be doing. For all the Court's passion to
see that the power of the other branches is strictly limited, it
seemed entirely unconcerned with limits on its own power. As
Justice Scalia pointed out, limits on the Court's habeas jurisdiction are restraints no less important than the writ's restraints on
150
executive power.
To determine the reach of the writ, the Court fashioned a threepart "functional" test. 15 1 The manipulability of this test, on display in its application here, invites question as to how it will be
applied in future cases, leaving uncertainty as to whether the writ
could be extended beyond Guantanamo to other places abroad.
Despite the Court's strenuous effort to circumvent history and
precedent to arrive at the point where it could make up its own
test, the detainees arguably failed at least two prongs of the test.
Thus, more manipulation by the Court was necessary to push the
detainees' claims through. The Court admitted that the detainees
did not satisfy the second factor, which focused on "the nature of

147. Id. at 2301 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. See Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 779.
149. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257-58.
150. See id. at 2297-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia stated that
'"[m]anipulation' of the territorial reach of the writ by the Judiciary poses just as much a
threat to the proper separation of powers as 'manipulation' by the Executive." Id. at 2298.
151. Id. at 2259 (majority opinion).
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152
the sites where apprehension and then detention took place.
Because the detainees were captured abroad and held outside
United States sovereign territory, the Court stated, this factor
weighed against extending the writ. 153 However, this factor was
(conveniently) found not dispositive.154 With the Court ignoring
this factor, sovereignty may no longer have any effective role in
habeas jurisdiction. The Court then saw to it that the detainees
could satisfy the third factor, "the practical obstacles inherent in
resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ," only by a profound disregard for the discretion of the political branches during
wartime. 155 The Court found no practical obstacles, stating that
the Government had put forth "no credible arguments that the
military mission at Guantanamo would be compromised."' 56 However, the Government's brief appropriately contained only legal
arguments, not hitherto irrelevant discussions of practical obstacles. 157 It is, of course, not surprising that the Government did not
present arguments to meet a test the Court simply made up.
Thus, the Court summarily dismissed the idea that its decision in
this case could have any adverse effect on the fight against terrorism, without even giving the Government a fair opportunity to
argue otherwise. In future cases, the Government will vigorously
argue that practical obstacles weigh in its favor, leaving the Court
to wrestle with delicate national security issues it is in no position
to decide.
The outcome of the Court's decision-the extension of habeas
rights to aliens detained at Guantanamo-may afford suspected
enemy combatants a greater opportunity to assert their innocence
and may have hastened the end of Guantanamo's use as a detention center. As a policy issue, this outcome will be welcomed by
many. In his article, Dworkin noted approvingly that the Court
"has now declared that this shameful episode in our history must
end."15 8 However, the Court's power to declare is valid only to the
extent that its declarations are supported by a fair interpretation
of the controlling law. When the Court ignores limits on its own
power and rushes to invalidate the will of the people without com152. Id.
153. Id. at 2260.
154. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2260.
155. See id. at 2259.
156. Id. at 2261.
157. See Brief for the Respondents, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (Nos. 061195 and 06-1196).
158. Dworkin, supra note 126.
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pelling justification, it is not doing its job. The majority's flimsy
legal reasoning, with its manipulation of history and precedent
and its weak and wavering language, provides scant justification
for this bold move. The Court ultimately made a political decision
and, regardless of whether it chose a good policy, stepped outside
its proper role.
James Thornburg

